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The Walters critique of EMU presumed that pro-cyclical country-speci￿c real interest rates would
incorporate signi￿cant macroeconomic instability in an environment of asymmetric shocks. The
literature on optimum currency areas suggests a number of criteria to minimize this risk, such as
market ￿exibility, high degrees of openness, ￿nancial integration or similarity in in￿ation rates.
In this paper, we argue that an essential part of macroeconomic volatility in a monetary union’s
member country also depends on the mechanism of forming expectations. This is mainly due
to (i) the construction of ex ante country-speci￿c real interest rate, implying a strong or weak
negative correlation with current in￿ation rate and (ii) anticipated (and hence smoothed) loss in
competitiveness and boom-bust cycle. In a 2-region 2-sector New Keynesian DSGE model, we
apply 5 di￿erent speci￿cations of ex ante real interest rates, based on commonly considered types
of expectations: rational, adaptive, static, extrapolative and regressive, as well as their hybrids.
Our simulations show that rational expectations dominate the other speci￿cations in terms of
minimizing the volatility of the most macroeconomic variables. This conclusion is generally
insensitive to which group of agents (producers or consumers) and which region (home or foreign)
forms the expectations. It also turns out that for some types of expectations the Walters critique
indeed applies, i.e. the system does not ful￿l the Blanchard-Kahn conditions or the system’s
companion matrix has explosive eigenvalues.
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41 Introduction
The process of absorbing asymmetric shocks in monetary unions has been investigated in a long
strand of literature, dating back to classical papers by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and
Kenen (1969). They laid foundations for the optimum currency area (OCA) literature and were
followed by a large number of theoretical and empirical contributions (see Mongelli, 2002, for an
overview). They enumerate the conditions ensuring that occurance of asymmetric shocks should ether
be unlikely or at least followed by a smooth adjustment process. The list includes i.a. price and wage
￿exibility, production factor mobility, openness to trade (preferably concentrated within the monetary
union), ￿nancial market integration, ￿scal and political integration, diversi￿cation of production and
consumption structures, as well as similarity of in￿ation rates.
The market-based adjustment involves two phenomena of particular interest. Firstly, if a positive
shock leads to an expansion in a small economy and an increase in in￿ation rate, the real interest rates
fall, which additionally fuels the boom. This procyclical feature of country-level real interest rates (see
i.a. European Commission, 2006; Roubini et al., 2007; European Commission, 2008; Tor￿j, 2009a) was
￿rst emphasized by Walters (1994) as a source of inherent instability, potentially leading to a break-up
of a heterogenous monetary union. Secondly, the ￿Walters critique￿ does not account for the fact that
a boom in a small open economy erodes the competitiveness of domestic products. Consequently,
this leads to a fall in demand and realignment to equilibrium. This competitiveness channel (see i.a.
European Commission, 2006; Tor￿j, 2009a) is e￿ective as long as ￿exible markets ensure timely real
appreciation in the domestic economy and the level of production remains su￿ciently sensitive to the
real exchange rate against the rest of the monetary union. A symmetric reasoning applies for an
adverse shock (followed by an increase in real interest rate and real exchange rate depreciation).
The determinants of adjustment dynamics were already described in the initial phases of OCA
literature, including pioneering phase of 1960s and reconciliation phase of 1970s (see Mongelli,
2002). However, since then, the analytical frameworks in macroeconomics advanced substantially.
In particular, the rational expectations revolution (originating from seminal contributions by Muth
(1961) and Lucas (1976)) introduced dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models as mainstream
modelling devices. While the New Keyesian, expectation-based models were developed, the OCA
literature ￿ as evaluated by Mongelli (2002) ￿ developed relatively slowly in a ￿reassessment phase￿ in
1980 due to unclear monetary integration prospects of that time, followed by an empirical phase in
1990s when EMU was already in preparation. However, to the best of our knowledge, the model-based
work on OCA criteria does not explicitly analyse the role of expectations in the realignment of a small
economy after an asymmetric shock.
In this paper, we attempt to ￿ll this gap by a formalized discussion of the role that expectations
play in the adjustment process. We ask whether the choice of a particular mechanism of forming
expectations could signi￿cantly in￿uence a country’s capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks, and ￿ if
yes ￿ which mechanism seems to be the most e￿cient. To address this issue, we apply a DSGE model
of a 2-region monetary union and investigate impulse-response functions and variances generated by
5this model under di￿erent expectation types. Also, we check whether the Walters critique applies for
some particular types, i.e. whether the model’s stability conditions hold. Finally, we allow consumers
and producers (as well as home and domestic agents) to di￿er in terms of expectation types and ask
whether some of the combinations yield lower volatility of macroeconomic variables than under perfect
homogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we develop a New Keynesian model of a
monetary union that will be used as an analytical tool to answer the above questions. In Section 4 we
present the calibration, considered expectation types and simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Expectations and OCA: literature review
In a monetary union, agents could anticipate a number of strong links between the home and foreign
economy being at work (see also Tor￿j, 2009b). Firstly, the common central bank would react to
foreign demand shocks with a move in the common policy rate, which would in turn translate directly
into a change in domestic monetary conditions. Secondly, a foreign shock a￿ects future price dynamics
abroad. As a result, the real exchange rate and domestic monetary conditions would change. Thirdly,
foreign business cycle a￿ects the domestic output due to international trade and investment links.
Economic agents are therefore capable to predict an economic slowdown at home when they observe
one in other countries.
Outside a monetary union, the forecasting capacity of agents would be limited as the nominal exchange
rate ￿uctuations and separate monetary policies of domestic and foreign central banks would introduce
additional degrees of freedom.
The ample literature on the endogeneity of OCA criteria (e.g. integration of ￿nance and trade in
a common currency area, see e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1998 or European Commission, 2008) suggests
growing interdependence of individual countries’ output gaps after creating a monetary union. As
a result, the forward-looking behaviour developed by agents might equip the economy with a strong
stabilizing force inside the monetary union.
Firstly, the adjustment via competitiveness channel could be anticipated and help in containing the
preceding boom in advance. For example, Andersson et al. (2008, p. 37) note that this forward-looking
behaviour has been institutionalized in Belgian enterprises. The growth rate of wages within the next
2 years cannot exceed predicted growth rate of wages in Germany, France and the Netherlands ￿
Belgium’s main trading partners. Also, Calmfors and Johansson (2006) show that an irrevocably ￿xed
exchange rate might prevent exporters from signing long-term wage contracts.
Secondly, the process of forming expectations in￿uences the de￿nition of ex ante real interest rate and
hence the dynamics of the real interest rate e￿ect. The type of expectations decides how strongly
in￿ation expectations are correlated with the current in￿ation rate. If this correlation was weak,
a boom in economy would not translate into growing expectations, at least not in the short run.
European Commission (2006) emphasizes that there is more cross-country variation in in￿ation rates
6than in the measures of in￿ation expectations in euro area countries. They also stress that producers
and consumers might di￿er signi￿cantly as regards the mechanisms of forming in￿ation expectations.
Namely, producers should put more weight on external price dynamics, be more forward-looking and
rational.
Finally, apart from asymmetric shock absorption, the literature describes other real aspects of
consumers’ expectations and perceptions in the aftermath of euro adoption. They include i.a. the
￿euro illusion￿, i.e. an over-proportional growth of perceived in￿ation rate (see Narodowy Bank Polski,
2009, for an extensive overview). It might result in rising in￿ation expectations, second-round e￿ects
and drop in consumption due to lower perceived real income.
3 New Keynesian model of a monetary union
In this Section, we develop a DSGE model for the analysis of country-level adjustment to shocks under
di￿erent expectation types. It builds strongly upon multi-region currency union models with possible
heterogeneity, such as e.g. ones considered in the works by Benigno (2004), Lombardo (2006), Brissimis
and Skotida (2008) or Kolasa (2009). The currency union consists of 2 regions. The whole economy of
the monetary union, in line with a conventional treatment in the DSGE literature 1, is represented by
the interval h0;1i, whereby the ￿rst region (say, home economy) is indexed over h0;wi (relative size of
the region: w), and the second (foreign economy) is indexed over hw;1i.
As the behaviour of the nontradable sector is considered to be a crucial element of adjustment dynamics
(see e.g. European Commission, 2008, 2009), both economies consist of two sectors. Each of them is
characterized by price rigidities, modelled with Calvo (1983) mechanism. Conventionally, consumers
in each region maximize their utility and producers in each sector ￿ their present and discounted future
pro￿ts. International exchange of goods incorporates the competitiveness channel of adjustment into
the model and ensures that in the long run both economies return to their equilibrium after a shock.
This is also true for a small economy that does not have an autonomous monetary policy, which is
modelled for the entire currency union via a simple Taylor rule with smoothing.
The model incorporates a number of standard New Keynesian nominal and real rigidities, such as
price stickiness modelled with the Calvo mechanism, wage stickiness, price and wage indexation
or consumption habits. While monetary policy is always symmetric (with a possibly asymmetric
transmission mechanism though), there are four other shocks in the model that can be asymmetric
(region-speci￿c): demand shocks, supply shocks in the tradable and non-tradable sector, as well as
labour supply shocks.
Henceforth, parameters of the foreign economy are denoted analogously to home economy and marked
with an asterisk, e.g.  and . Lowercase letters denote the log-deviations of their uppercase
counterparts from the steady-state values.
1See Benigno (2004); Blessing (2008); Kolasa (2009).
73.1 Household decisions
3.1.1 Intratemporal allocation of consumption
Households get utility from consumption and disutility from hours worked. In addition, utility from
consumption depends on consumption habits formed in the previous period (see Smets and Wouters,
2003; Kolasa, 2009). The constant relative returns to scale utility function takes the following form
(compare Gal￿, 2008):










where Ct ￿ consumption at t, Ht ￿ stock of consumption habits at t, Nt ￿ hours worked at t,  > 0
and  > 0. Consumption habits are assumed to be proportional to consumption at t   1 (see Fuhrer,
2000; Smets and Wouters, 2003):
Ht = hCt 1 (2)


















where  2 (0;1) characterizes the share of nontradables in the home economy and  > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between the goods produced in both sectors.


















An analogous relationship holds for the foreign economy. Given this,  is an intuitive measure of
degree of openness and 1    ￿ home bias in consumption.  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign tradables.
A single type of good is indexed with k and belongs to good variety indexed over the interval h0;1i.















































8The parameter "T > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between various types of goods in
international trade, k indexes the variety of goods, and j ￿ the households (integral over j re￿ects the
di￿erence in both economies’ size).

















































For both tradable consumption baskets (i.e. H and F), we de￿ne equal elasticity of substitution between
various types of goods, "T, both at home and abroad.













































Consequently, "N and "N is de￿ned as elasticity of substitution between various types of nontradable
goods.




tU (Ct;Nt;Ht) ! max
C;N
(7)
where  2 (0;1) is households’ discount factor. Maximization of (7) is subject to a sequence of current


























N;t;kdj dk + Et fQt;t+1Dt+1g  Dt + WtNt
(8)
The right-hand side is a household’s budget at t. Its income consists of payo￿s of securities acquired in
the previous periods (Dt), labour incomes (Wt ￿ nominal wage for hours worked at t) and government
transfers (Tt). The left-hand side of the inequality sums the consumption spendings of households
(where P denotes a price of a particular consumption bundle, indexed in line with these bundles) and
acquisition of securities. Qt;t+1 is a stochastic discount factor for the payo￿s at t + 1, faced by the
households.
Maximizing (7) subject to (8) leads to the following ￿rst order conditions:
























































 demand equations (home and foreign) for domestic tradable goods:































 home and foreign demand equations for all tradable goods:






































































































































































































Log-linearization and di￿erencing the formulas (19) and (21) lead to the following dependencies:
T;t = (1   )H;t + F;t 
T;t = (1   )F;t + H;t (22)
t = (1   )T;t + N;t 
t = (1   )
T;t + 
N;t (23)
Using the above equations, we derive domestic demand functions for the domestic tradable, foreign











































Analogous equations hold for the foreign economy.
3.1.2 Intertemporal allocation of consumption





11where Vt;t+1 is the price at t of an Arrow security, i.e. a one-period security paying 1 at t + 1 when
a speci￿c state of nature occurs and 0 otherwise. t;t+1 is the probability that the state of nature
in which 1 is paid materializes, conditional on the state of nature at t. Having the access to such a
security market, households can transfer utility between periods, maximizing its discounted ￿ow (see
Gal￿ and Monacelli, 2005).
The optimality of decisions requires that the marginal loss in utility due to buying the security at
t instead of allocating this money to consumption must equal the discounted payo￿ at t + 1, also
expressed in terms of marginal growth of future utility:
Vt;t+1
Pt
"d;t (Ct   Ht)




whereby Ct+1 and Pt+1 in the above equation should be interpreted as conditional expected values
given the state of nature when the payo￿ is nonzero.












We calculate the conditional expected value of both sides, which ￿ along with =t  Et (Qt;t+1) ￿ leads













Log-linearization of (30) around the steady state allows us to write the following dependence:
ct   hct 1 = Et (ct+1   hct)  
1   h

[it   (Etpt+1   pt) + ln] +
1   h

("d;t   Et"d;t+1) (31)
where lowercase variables are percentage deviations from the steady state for their uppercase










(it   Ett+1   ) +
1   h
(1 + h)
("d;t   Et"d;t+1) (32)
where it   ln=t denotes short-term nominal interest rate at t, Ett+1 = Etpt+1   pt ￿ expected
domestic consumer price growth,  =  ln ￿ natural interest rate corresponding to the households’
discount factor .
3.2 International prices





Log-linearizing (33) around a symmetric steady state St = 1 ￿ the law of one price in the tradable
sector ￿ leads to the following relationship:
st = pH;t   pF;t (34)





An analogous approximation allows us to write:
xt = pT;t   pN;t (36)
Using (33) and (23) we can write:
pT;t = pH;t   st (37)
pt = pT;t   xt = pN;t + (1   )xt (38)
The real exchange rate Qt (qt for log-deviation from the steady state) versus the rest of the monetary
union takes the form:
qt = pt   p
t = (1      )st   xt + x
t (39)
Real exchange rate Qt (qt in log-deviations from the steady state) appreciation is then linked to the
appreciation of external terms of trade, depreciation of domestic internal terms of trade (de￿ned as in
(36)) and appreciation of foreign internal terms of trade.
3.3 International risk sharing
Household can smooth their consumption not only in time, but also in international ￿nancial markets
(Blessing, 2008; Gal￿, 2008; Kolasa, 2009; Lipiæska, 2008). Under complete markets, equation (28)



















13Access to common, integrated ￿nancial market, allows to write an equation analogous to (41), derived



















Combining (29) and (41), we obtain:










Following Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005) we assume that # = # = 1. This does not a￿ect the generality,
except for restricting the initial conditions on the stock of net foreign assets and states of nature.
Log-linearizing equation (42) around a steady-state allows to derive a relation between home and
foreign consumption and the real exchange rate (see also Chari et al., 2002):

1   h









d;t   qt (43)
3.4 Producers
3.4.1 Real marginal costs














t is an exogenous technological process (analogously for the nontradable sector N).
Following Clarida et al. (1999), we assume away the price deviations of individual varieties within a
sector as of second-order importance in the proximity of the steady state. This allows us to integrate
the formulas (44) and (45) into sectoral production functions with supply shocks denoted "H
t and "N
t
respectively (henceforth as recycling notation for the logs).
The real marginal cost (as log-deviation from the steady-state) is calculated as a di￿erence between
the wage level in the region (wt) and the sectoral producer price log-level plus the log of marginal
labour product (mpn) (por. Gal￿ and Monacelli, 2005):
mcH
t  wt   pH
t   mpnH
t mcN
t  wt   pN
t   mpnN
t (46)
The real marginal product is equal across producers in a given sector. After substituting into (46) the
derivatives of both functions with respect to Nt, we obtain:
14mcH















Using equations (37)-(38) and the labour supply equation (16) leads to:
mcH




























There are nominal price rigidities in the economy. Following the usual approach in the New Keynesian
literature, we model them by means of the Calvo (1983) scheme. In a given period, a fraction  of
producers are not allowed to reoptimize their prices in reaction to economic innovations and must sell
at the price from the previous period. The probability of being allowed to reoptimize the price is equal
across producers: 1  in each period, independently of the amount of time elapsed since the last price
change.
Some of the producers allowed to change their price do not really reoptimize. Following Gal￿ and
Gertler (1999) we assume that the change in price is partly implemented as an indexation to past
in￿ation. This mechanism leads to a hybrid Phillips curve (see Gal￿ and Gertler (1999); Gal￿ et al.
(2001)), commonly considered to outperform the purely forward-looking speci￿cations in terms of
empirical goodness-of-￿t. Following Kolasa (2009), in￿ation is modelled separately in the tradable and
nontradable sector.
As Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) we assume that a fraction 1  of producers are able to change their price















t and  pN
t denote the prices set newly at t by the 1    fraction of producers. Among the
producers who reoptimize prices there is a fraction of 1 ! producers reoptimizing in an anticipatory
manner as in Calvo (1983). They maximize the discounted ￿ow of future pro￿ts, using all information
available at the time of decision and taking into account future constraints. The rest of producers ( !)














15Following Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), prices set by the latter group of producers are modelled as
reoptimized prices from the previous period, indexed to past in￿ation:
pH
b;t =  pH
t 1 + H
t 1 pN
b;t =  pN
t 1 + N
t 1 (53)
One can show (see Gal￿ and Gertler, 1999; Gal￿ et al., 2001; Gal￿, 2008 for details) that the reoptimized
prices satisfy the following conditions:
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where T   ln "
T
"T 1 and N   ln "
N
"N 1 are log-markups in the steady state (or markups in an
economy without price rigidities), mct ￿ real marginal cost at t.

































where mct now denote the deviation of real marginal cost from its long-run value in the respective
sector (analogously for the foreign economy).
3.5 Market clearing conditions
Equilibrium on the world markets of individual goods requires equality of overall production and













= CH;t;k + C
H;t;k =
= 1































































































































An analogous expression can be written for the sector of foreign tradables ( F):
Y F








































Log-linearizing around the steady-state, in which ratio of consumption levels in both economies is
proportional to their relative size ( C
C = w
1 w) leads to the following conditions:
yH
t = ~ wct + (1   ~ w)c
t   [ ~ w + (1   ~ w)(1   )]st   ~ wxt   (1   ~ w)x
t (62)
yF
t = ~ wct + (1   ~ w)c




w(1   )(1   )
w(1   )(1   ) + (1   w) (1   )
~ w =
w(1   )
w(1   ) + (1   w)(1   )(1   )
(64)
Market clearing conditions for the nontradable sector can be written using (11) as:

















Using the de￿nition of internal terms of trade, (35), we get:
YN;t = X
(1 )
t Ct Y 







17Log-linearizing (66) around the steady state leads to the following equilibrium conditions:
yN
t = (1   )xt + ct yN
t = (1   )x
t + c
t (67)
In further analyses, we treat all the log-linearized variables as deviations from a ￿natural￿ state of
economy, driven by the exogenous technological processes aT
t and aN
t and undistorted by price relations.
Henceforth we drop aT
t and aN
t and treat yT
t and yN
t as output gaps in each sector.
3.6 Monetary policy
The central bank’s monetary policy is described with a Taylor (1993) rule with smoothing, which is
a commonly applied description in the literature and empirically tested as an adequate tool for both
the euro area (see e.g. Sauer and Sturm, 2003) and Poland (see i.a. Kolasa, 2009; Gradzewicz and
Makarski, 2009). The common nominal interest rate is set according to the equation:
it =  + (1   )(~ t + y~ yt) + it 1 (68)
where it ￿ central bank policy rate at t, ~ yt ￿ the output gap in a currency union, ~ t ￿ in￿ation rate in
a currency union,  2 (0;1) ￿ smoothing parameter,  > 1; y > 0 ￿ parameters of central bank’s
response to deviations of in￿ation and output from the equilibrium levels. The condition  > 1 is
necessary to satisfy the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), leading to a unique equilibrium.
The output gap and in￿ation rate for the currency union aggregate the values for individual regions,













tdj = w~ yt + (1   w) ~ y
t (70)
3.7 Labour market
Equation (16) implies a perfect labour market ￿exibility. According to Walsh (2010), however, this
would lead to a poor empirical ￿t of the model. We therefore apply a simpli￿ed version of a mechanism
described by Erzeg et al. (2000) and used i.a. by Kolasa (2009). It allows the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure, mrst, to equal the real wage, wt   pt, but only in the










(ct   hct 1) + nt + "l
t   "d
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t = yN
t + (1   )yH
t   aN
t   (1   )aH
t   "N
t   (1   )"H
(72)
whereby the approximation assumes a long-term technological symmetry across sectors. The above
equation can be used to replace employment in equation (71) by production and current values of
supply shocks.
In the short run, let nominal wages be sticky and behave according to the Calvo scheme. Under
monopolistic competition in the labour market, individual domestic and foreign households supply
di￿erentated types of labour services, Nj, with the elasticity of substitution "w. Total labour supply




























Only a fraction of households, 1   w 2 (0;1), can renegotiate their wages at every period. This
fraction remains constant and households allowed to reoptimize are selected at random. In particular,
the probability of being allowed to renegotiate the wage does not depend on the period elapsed since
the last change. Other households partly index their their wages to past consumer in￿ation. Their
fraction is represented by the parameter !w 2 (0;1).
Households able to renegotiate their nominal wage maximize the present and the discounted future
utilities subject to constraints resulting from expected future labour demand and the fact that the wage





(1   w)(1   w)
w [1 + "w]
[mrst   (wt   pt)]   !w (t   t 1) (75)
An analogous solution holds for the foreign economy.
3.8 Model equations
The log-linearized dynamic model is composed of the Euler equation for consumption (32), sectoral
Phillips curves (56) and (57), wage equation (75), real marginal cost de￿nitions (49) and (50) along with
19their foreign counterparts, equilibrium conditions (62), (63) and (67), equation of common monetary
policy (68) and a set of identities de￿ning the aggregate values for the monetary union (69) and (70),
aggregate price dynamics and de￿ators. Model equations are explicitly listed in the Appendix.
The list of the random disturbances includes region-speci￿c demand ( "D
t ), supply ("T
t , "N
t ) and labour
supply ("l
t) shocks, as well as monetary policy ( "i
t) shock. In the estimation, shocks of the same type
are allowed to be correlated across regions, but are assumed to be independent across types. They
also follow a ￿rst-order autoregressive process.
3.9 Procyclical real interest rate
The mechanism of procyclical real interest rates on the country level is a speci￿c feature of
monetary unions (or, more generally, ￿xed exchange rate regimes). To see this, re-write the Euler
equation for consumption (32) and substitute for the expected consumer price dynamics its log-linear
approximations (22) and (23). Also, decompose expected in￿ation rates in individual sectors into a














it   (1   )(1   )[EtH;t+1 + (1   )H;t 1]+
 (1   )[F;t+1 + (1 )F;t 1]   [EtN;t+1 + (1 )N;t 1]   
) (76)
The negative correlation between current in￿ation rate and in￿ation expectations becomes stronger
with decreasing  (i.e. when the backward-looking part weighs more). Also, as emphasized by
European Commission (2006), the in￿ation expectations should be decoupled from domestic producer
price dynamics when the economy is more open (i.e. high values of  and low  in (76)). In the
next Section, we investigate the extent to which the composition of expectations might a￿ect the
macroeconomic volatility.
4 Country-level macroeconomic stability under di￿erent
expectation types: simulation exercise
The model described above is used for simulating the adjustment process in the presence of asymmetric
shocks. The properties of this process are characterized in this section in two ways: by investigating
(i) the impulse-response functions and (ii) second-moment properties of the variables generated with
the model.
2A more formalized discussion of expectation types follows in Section (4).
20Table 1: Calibration of the model
parameter value parameter value parameter value
 1:666 d = 
d 0:65  =  0:841
 1:275 H = F 0:62  0:704
!H = !F 0:391 N = 
N 0:70  1:795
!N = !
N 0:147 W = 
W 0:62 y 0:482
!W = !
W 0:098 i = 
i 0  =  0:995
H = F 0:447 2
d = 2








N 0:912  =  0:765
h = h 0:770 2
W = 2
W 5:52 w 0:034
 =  0:5 2
i = 2
i 0:092 "W 3:000
 =  2:0
Source: author.
4.1 Model calibration
Table 1 describes the calibration of the model, based on three sources. Most parameters (elasticities
of substitution between home and foreign tradables, Calvo probabilities, parameters of indexation,
habit persistence, disutility from labour and the Taylor rule) were estimated with full information
maximum likelihood method by Tor￿j (2010). They were chosen so as to represent a ￿median￿ euro
area country, i.e. as a median over the estimates in the group of 12 euro area countries. In the study of
Tor￿j (2010), the model’s parameters were estimated in 12 country pairs, in which the home economy
represented one of the 12 countries under consideration and the foreign economy represented the rest
of the monetary union. This median country has a relative size of 3:4% of the union. Country weight,
as well as ,  and , were calibrated in a standard way in the same article and also represent a median
over the 12 countries.
Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( ) and elasticity of substitution between the tradables
and nontradables () were calibrated in line with Stockman and Tesar (1995). Finally, the parameters
describing the stochastic properties of the disturbance vector (serial correlations and variances) are
based on the values obtained by Kolasa (2009) for the euro area. Wherever possible, the home and
foreign economy are described by the same parameter values.
4.2 Simulation scenarios: types of expectations
In the simulations, we apply 5 basic types of expectations commonly considered in the literature.
Following Pilbeam (2006), we specify:
 static expectations:
Etvt+1 = vt (77)
21Economic agents expect that variable v shall remain at the current level at t + 1. As
macroeconomic data is normally released with a lag, the speci￿cation Etvt+1 = vt 1 seems
to be more realistic. A one-period lag should also remain generally compatible with a quarterly
frequency of the model’s variables (production, consumption, in￿ation rate).
 adaptive expectations:
Etvt+1 = a  vt + (1   a)  Et 1vt (78)
whereby 0 < a < 1. This type of expectations represents an inertial process, in which agents
update their beliefs in every period. It is characterized by the coe￿cient a that weighs information
acquired at t (or t   1, when the data reading is lagged). Iterating equation (78) backwards, we
conclude that adaptive expectations ￿ unlike static ones ￿ apply non-zero weights not only to
values at t   1, but also in preceding periods.
 extrapolative expectations:
Etvt+1 = vt + a(vt   vt 1) (79)
whereby a > 0. Economic agents specify the expected value of v one period ahead, extrapolating
its current value using part of its recent dynamics.
 regressive expectations:
Etvt+1 = avt + (1   a)  v (80)
whereby 0 < a < 1 and  v denotes the steady-state value of v. Speci￿cation (80) captures
economic agents’ perception of a variable as mean-reverting with some degree of inertia. Like
in case of static expectations, we replace vt by vt 1 due to lags in macroeconomic readings and
￿nally obtain Etvt+1 = avt 1 + (1   a)  v.
 rational expectations:
ER
t vt+1 = vt+1 + ut+1 (81)
whereby E (ut+1) = 0. This means that agents do not commit systematic errors in the process
of forming expectations.
In the case of parametrized expectation types, we consider a = 0:33 or a = 0:66 for extrapolative and
regressive expectations, as well as a = 0:5 for adaptive ones. In the two-variant cases, this allows us
to take into consideration the strength of anchoring around the steady state level and of extrapolation
22(respectively) as additional determinants of the adjustment process in the analysis. This constitutes 7
scenarios with homogenous expectations.
On top of that, we take into account 6 mixed-type expectations, in which rational expectations enter
with a weight 0:5 and the other half is represented by any of the other types:
Etvt+1 = 0:5  ER
t vt+1 + 0:5  Em
t vt+1
with index m representing extrapolative, regressive, adaptive or static expectations (with a consistent
parametrization).3 Finally, with the 7 homogenous speci￿cations, this yields 13 types for simulation
analysis.
The impulse-response functions, presented in Figures 1-4, were calculated with the assumption that all
agents within the economy represent the same type of expectations. In further tables, we consider all
132 combinations resulting from di￿erentiation of expectation types between two groups: (i) domestic
and foreign agents and (ii) producers and consumers.
4.3 Model stability
Simulation exercises can only be completed when the model structure guarantees an appropriate
solution. In the scenarios with at least partly rational expectations, this requires that Blanchard-Kahn
(1980) conditions be satis￿ed so that there exists a unique saddle-path stable solution. Wherever any
form of rational expectations is absent from the model, its log-linear approximation can be directly
represented as a SVAR(1) process, premultiplied by the inverse of the matrix of parameters for the
expectational terms. In this case, however, the stability of the system needs to be investigated, i.e.
whether the companion matrix of the system does or does not contain explosive eigenvalues.
It turns out that for some types of expectations (or their combinations), the system does not ful￿l its
appropriate stability condition (see Table 2):
1. When all agents (domestic and foreign, consumers and producers) represent the same type of
expectations, the model is unstable for adaptive, static or extrapolative expectations. Note
that this is not the case when these types are combined with rational expectations in equal
proportions.
2. When we di￿erentiate between domestic and foreign agents, the type of expectations
prevailing in the home economy (intuitively) determines whether the model is stable or not.
Namely, Blanchard-Kahn conditions are violated because of an excessive number of unstable
roots when domestic agents’ expectations are adaptive, extrapolative or static. This can be
explained by the fact that adjustments in the foreign economy are to a large extent supported
3This can be viewed as either an ad hoc representation of all agents’ expectations, being represented by a convex linear
combination of basic theoretical mechanisms, or as a representation of heterogenous agents in the economy. However,
the latter interpretation requires that necessary aggregation conditions hold. See Branch and McGough (2009); Koloch
(2010) for their technical exposition.
23by the common monetary policy, which is not the case for the relatively small, home economy.
However, the model’s instability can also originate in the foreign economy, as long as it represents
agents with extrapolative expectations.
3. A more nuanced picture emerges from the di￿erentiation between consumers and producers
(see Table 3b). Extrapolative expectations still induce the model’s instability, regardless of the
value of a and the group of agents that forms them. Moreover, a high number of unstable models
involves either static or adaptive expectations in one of the groups. Note, however, that under
rational expectations in one of the groups, the model always ful￿ls the stability conditions (except
for the previously mentioned case of extrapolative expectations in the other group). It should
perhaps be stressed that partly rational expectations also highly improve the model’s stability.
The results from Table 2 cannot be regarded as completely discarding the Walters critique. In fact,
the model can be seen as inherently unstable for some of the combinations. This does not necessarily
result from the participation in a monetary union. However, the di￿erentiation between domestic and
foreign agents reveals that an autonomous monetary policy (or the common monetary policy from the
perspective of a big economy in a monetary union) can be seen as a strongly stabilizing mechanism
when the type of expectations does not support the adjustment process. In particular, adaptive or
static expectations turned out to induce instability in the small home economy, but ensure stability in
the big foreign economy.
4.4 Impulse-response analysis
Figures 1-4 present the impulse-response functions after 4 types of asymmetric shocks in the economy:
demand, supply (in tradable and nontradable sector) and labour supply. In this part of the analysis,
homogenous types of expectations are assumed (both for producers and consumers, as well as home
and domestic agents). Scenarios B, C and E are not included in the Figures because of the model’s
instability. Scenarios G and H were not presented because these types imply an incomparably higher
volatility.
For every type of asymmetric shock under consideration, the adjustment paths di￿er considerably (in
both quantitative and, more often than not, qualitative terms) with the type of expectations applied
in the model.
In the aftermath of an asymmetric demand shock hitting the home economy, only the level of
consumption (and hence nontradable production) remains insensitive to the choice of the scenario. All
other depicted variables (tradable production, in￿ation of tradables and nontradables, internal and
external terms of trade, real wages) adjust most e￿ciently to the equilibrium level in the scenario
where all agents are rational (A, blue line). The other extreme is represented by the scenario in which
expectations are half-rational and half-static (K, grey line). It can be characterized by both the highest
amplitude and, in some cases, a signi￿cant lag.
A comparable picture emerges from the analysis of impulse-response functions after an asymmetric
supply shocks in both sectors. For most of the variables, rational expectations (A, blue line) ensure
24Table 2: Existence of stable solutions under di￿erent expectations
foreign country
home country A B C1 C2 D1 D2 E F G H I J K
(A) rational 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(B) adaptive (a = 0:5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(C1) extrapolative (a = 0:66) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(C2) extrapolative (a = 0:33) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(D1) regressive (a = 0:66) 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(D2) regressive (a = 0:33) 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(E) static 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(F) 0:5A + 0:5B 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(G) 0:5A + 0:5C1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(H) 0:5A + 0:5C2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(I) 0:5A + 0:5D1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(J) 0:5A + 0:5D2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(K) 0:5A + 0:5E 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(a) home vs foreign agents’ expectations
consumers
producers A B C1 C2 D1 D2 E F G H I J K
(A) rational 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(B) adaptive (a = 0:5) 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
(C1) extrapolative (a = 0:66) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(C2) extrapolative (a = 0:33) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(D1) regressive (a = 0:66) 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(D2) regressive (a = 0:33) 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(E) static 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(F) 0:5A + 0:5B 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(G) 0:5A + 0:5C1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
(H) 0:5A + 0:5C2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
(I) 0:5A + 0:5D1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(J) 0:5A + 0:5D2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(K) 0:5A + 0:5E 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(b) producers’ vs consumers’ expectations
1 ￿ model can be solved/stable; 0 ￿ model does not ful￿l Blanchard-Kahn conditions/unstable.
Source: own calculations.
25Figure 1: Response to an asymmetric demand shock





























































































































26Figure 2: Response to an asymmetric supply shock in the tradable sector































































































































the lowest macroeconomic volatility and the most e￿cient adjustment process. However, a remarkable
pattern of consumption is noteworthy. A positive (but short-lived) supply shock generates a short-lived
drop in in￿ation rate, associated with higher in￿ation expectations for the future. They lower the ex
ante real interest rate and support a boom in consumption. In this case, rational expectations fail to
contain the boom, but succeed in ensuring a relatively quick realignment to the equilibrium level. On
the other hand, the boom is to a large extent contained by the regressive expectations, especially when
they are parametrized so as to ensure a strong anchoring around an equilibrium level ( a = 0:33, D1,
green line). If an asymmetric supply shock originates in the nontradable sector, the adjustment of the
consumption under rational expectations resembles the one in D1 scenario and clearly outpaces other
scenarios.
27Figure 3: Response to an asymmetric supply shock in the nontradable sector

































































































































28Figure 4: Response to an asymmetric labour supply shock
































































































































The economy’s response to an asymmetric adverse labour supply shock (Figure 4) also seems
to generate the least macroeconomic volatility under rational expectations. Rational agents anticipate
the loss in competitiveness associated with a sudden increase in wages and prices and, consequently,
the wage pressure quickly subsides. The households’ wage requirements fall, which outpaces the
competitive adjustment. Consequently, the economy avoids a long recession, associated with real
depreciation. The adjustment runs less e￿ciently if the link between current levels of macroeconomic
variables and their expected values is stronger.
29Table 3: Variance of individual variables under di￿erent expectation types (rescaled: A=1)
Expectations yT yNT c T NT s x rw
(A) rational 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(B) adaptive (a = 0:5) - - - - - - - -
(C1) extrapolative (a = 0:66) - - - - - - - -
(C2) extrapolative (a = 0:33) - - - - - - - -
(D1) regressive (a = 0:66) 2.83 2.65 2.02 0.75 0.60 2.59 3.43 3.91
(D2) regressive (a = 0:33) 7.13 7.28 5.23 2.91 4.92 6.35 8.11 13.04
(E) static - - - - - - - -
(F) 0:5A + 0:5B 3.22 2.13 1.70 3.51 7.27 2.92 3.33 3.29
(G) 0:5A + 0:5C1 94.98 24.25 40.64 19.39 59.09 87.93 54.46 20.38
(H) 0:5A + 0:5C2 587.91 80.43 171.26 38.01 145.45 546.40 421.79 74.06
(I) 0:5A + 0:5D1 1.96 2.13 1.72 1.13 1.19 1.82 2.40 2.55
(J) 0:5A + 0:5D2 2.79 2.37 1.87 2.22 3.35 2.52 2.92 3.38
(K) 0:5A + 0:5E 8.54 6.13 4.51 17.70 47.51 6.86 6.52 15.93
Identical process of expectation formation assumed between home and foreign agents, as well as
producers and consumers.
Source: own calculations.
4.5 Macroeconomic volatility under di￿erent expectation types
The insights from the IRF analysis can be completed by comparing the volatility of macroeconomic
variables in the model across 13 types of expectations under consideration. For this purpose, 50 paths
of 10000 observations of the (normally distributed) structural disturbance vector were generated. The
model was simulated using these paths under di￿erent types of expectations (every time, the same
path was used for all the scenarios under consideration). The volatilities of macroeconomic variables
were calculated and then averaged over the 50 paths.
Table 3 presents the variance of individual variables under 13 scenarios in question with full
homogeneity of expectation types across groups. In accordance with the previous conclusions from
the IRF analysis, rational expectations yield the lowest variance for most of the variables. Regressive
expectations (but only with lower a, i.e. stronger anchoring around the steady-state levels) rank best
in terms of in￿ation rate volatility. However, this improvement results in an increasing macroeconomic
volatility in the other categories.
At the other extreme, (partly) extrapolative expectations rank worst in terms of macroeconomic
volatility, followed by (partly) static ones. Intiutively, the higher value of parameter a for extrapolative
expectations, the higher was the variance of the other variables. Furthermore, adaptive expectations
(scenario B) rank better or worse that regressive expectations (scenario J), according to which variable
is taken into consideration. In general, they shift part of the volatility from quantities to prices,
lowering the variance of nontradable output and consumption, but boosting the variance of in￿ation
rates, price relations and hence the tradable output.
Di￿erentiating between the type of expectations among domestic and foreign agents leads to a
conclusion that, in general, the combination of rational agents both at home and abroad yields the
30lowest macroeconomic volatility (see Tables 4-7). This holds without any exception for consumption,
internal terms of trade and real wages. Few combinations rank better for individual variables, including
tradable output (domestic: A, foreign: D1), nontradable output (domestic: A, foreign G) and external
terms of trade (domestic: A, foreign: D1). Note that these combinations include either A (i.e. rational
expectations ￿ at home) or D1 (i.e. strongly anchored expectations ￿ abroad).
In case of tradable and nontradable in￿ation rates, there are more combinations ranking better in
terms of low variance than A at home and A abroad. They include:
 for 
T: A (domestic) + G or H (foreign); D1 (domestic) + A, D1, D2, I or J (foreign);
 for 
NT: A (domestic) + D1, G or H (foreign); D1 (domestic) + A, D1, D2, I or J (foreign).
This result means that in￿ation volatility at home could be reduced under regressive expectations (as
compared to rational) provided that:
1. expectations abroad are either rational or regressive (or a combination of both types);
2. a cost of rising volatility for other variables is taken into account.
Intuitively, the type of domestic agents’ expectations seems to in￿uence the domestic macroeconomic
volatility to a larger extent than foreign agents’. However, it shoud be stressed that the impact of the
latter type can be seen as non-negligible.
The rationality of all agents is also the scenario ensuring lowest macroeconomic volatility when we
consider a di￿erentiation between the type of expectations represented by producers and consumers in
both regions. Combination of rational consumers and rational producers resulted in lowest varaince
of tradable and nontradable output, consumption, as well as external and internal terms of trade (see
Tables 8-11).
However, in this case a few exceptions could be noted if the volatility of in￿ation rates and real
wages alone were used as a criterion. The best scenario supporting low in￿ation volatility turned out
to be a combination of rational producers (A) and strongly regressive consumers (D1). This result
could be explained by speci￿c features of the monetary union. On the one hand, rational producers
are more aware of future demand constraints associated with a possible loss (or gain) in external
competitiveness and hence anticipate the functioning of the competitiveness channel. On the other
hand, it is consumers’ behaviour that induces the procyclicality of the real interest rates and hence
a highly anchored expectations mitigate the real interest rate e￿ect. Bottom line, this improvement
only a￿ects in￿ation rates and ￿ like in the previous results ￿ would be associated in higher volatility
of quantities.
There are also a few scenarios in which the variance of the real wages could be reduced as compared
to rational producers and consumers. The optimum one combines rationality of producers and
extrapolative consumers. This, however, is highly undesirable when other variables are taken into




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35real wage volatility can be therefore treated analogously to higher labour market rigidity, which disables
deep adjustments in wages at the cost of higher output volatility.
The same applies to lower in￿ation volatility in some scenarios (both under full homogeneity of
expectation types and when they are di￿erentiated between groups of agents). In￿ation di￿erentials
within the euro area are sometimes interpreted as an artefact of e￿cient adjustment mechanisms
(Honohan and Lane, 2003; European Commission, 2006). When all groups (or a subgroup of agents)
represent e.g. strongly anchored expectations, this can very e￿ciently stabilize in￿ation, but disable
country-level adjustment after asymmetric shocks.
Tables 8-11 also reveal that the type of producers’ expectations a￿ects macroeconomic volatility of a
small open monetary union member country to a larger extent than consumers’ ones. In particular,
variance of the system’s variables takes extremely high values when producers’ expectations are static,
partly extrapolative or ￿ to a lesser extent ￿ adaptive. Also, it is the producers’ dimension along which
the pattern of instability is determined in a more remarkable way.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, the role of expectations in the cross-country adjustment process within a monetary union
is considered. We build a 2-region, 2-sector New Keynesian DSGE model of a monetary union including
4 types of asymmetric shocks: demand, tradable supply, nontradable supply and labour supply. We
concentrate on the adjustment process in the small home economy, accounting for approximately 3%
economic size of the monetary union. The model was calibrated so as to re￿ect basic structural
characteristics of a median euro area economy.
Our main ￿nding is that rational expectations minimize macroeconomic volatility in the presence of
asymmetric shocks. This speci￿cation of expectations outperforms any other type in consideration:
static, adaptive, regressive and extrapolative, as well as ￿hybrid￿ types. This conclusion holds for most
of the economic variables. When we allow producers and consumers (also home and foreign agents)
to form expectations with di￿erent mechanisms, a scenario of rational expectations in both groups
generally outperforms other combinations.
The exceptions from this rule include mostly regressive (and strongly anchored) expectations in one
(or both) groups and occur mainly for in￿ation rates in the tradable and nontradable sector, as well
as real wages. In such a world, prices could be more stable at the cost of more volatile quantities.
In the context of a monetary union, this can be interpreted as dampening of in￿ation volatility that
reduces the e￿ciency of the cross-country adjustment process via in￿ation di￿erentials. It should be
emphasized that the expectations formed by producers can in￿uence the home economy to a greater
extent than the type represented by consumers. The impact of foreign agents’ type of expectations is
also non-negligible, albeit lower than domestic agents’ ones.
Finally, it should be noted that an inherent instability ￿ as characterized by Walters (1994) ￿ is





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40policy targets mainly the foreign economy, the above conclusion mainly applies for domestic agents.
In this context, rational expectations can be seen as an e￿ective supplement for other adjustment
mechanisms, including the competitiveness channel.
The above results stress the importance of economic education and information campaign in the process
of euro adoption. If economic agents are familiar with the economic system and correctly anticipate
its dynamics, they are able to smooth a large proportion of the increased macroeconomic volatility,
associated with the loss of autonomous monetary policy and possibility of adjustments via the FX
market. Agents’ rationality can substantially support the competitiveness channel and dampens the
real interest rate procyclicality inside a monetary union.
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